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9. At 291f£., Stout discusses "three 'formidable constituencies' that are 
currently contending for control of the American state." He remarks that 
"[d]emocracy will face unpromising odds at the national level so long as the 
three entrenched constituencies jointly control the political landscape" (292). 
I would add that the state itself is a formidable political actor which can pose 
its own distinctive threat to democracy. 
10. See, for example, the interview with Hauerwas posted at: http://www 
.beliefnet.com/storyI146/story _14666_1.html. 
Speaking of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the interviewer said to Hauerwas "But his 
beef with liberal democracy seems more philosophical and thoroughgoing. 
He says that the language of rights and liberties, as you write in your book, 
'cannot help but lead to godlessness and the subsequent deification of man, 
which is the proclamation of nihilism.'" Hauerwas replied "That's right, and 
in noting that, I hoped some people would see a parallel to the present day in 
this country." 
11. See 289, where Stout says "Assuming, as I do, that democratic indi-
viduality is a good thing, not to be confused with atomistic dissolution of 
social life." 
12. See 308: "we should not imagine the life-giving sources on which we 
depend as something alien to American democratic modernity. That stream is 
in us and of us when we engage in our democratic practices." 
13. Stout seems to treat his faith in his fellow citizens as basic. It seems to be 
on the basis of such faith that he puts his hope in democracy. In moving from 
faith in his fellow citizens to faith in democracy, Stout reverses what I believe 
to be the more plausible order of argument followed by Rawls. Rawls argues 
first (and at very great length) that it is possible for human beings to sustain a 
just liberal democracy. He then argues from this conclusion to the conclusion 
that human beings have a moral nature; see Political Liberalism, lxi-Ixii. 
Clearly Rawls can proceed as he does because he has substantive standards 
of justice available to him: he takes a liberal democracy to be just only if its po-
litical outcomes are constrained by reasonable principles of justice. Since Stout 
does not endorse principles of justice or any other criteria for just political out-
comes, he is not in a position to say much about what a just liberal democracy 
would be like. If he cannot say what a just liberal democracy would be like, 
then it is hard to see how he can argue that it is possible for people to sustain 
a just liberal democracy except by appeal to faith in his fellow citizens. In that 
case, the Rawlsian order of argument may not be open to him. 
Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy, by Patrick R. Frierson. 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. x + 211 pages. $55.00 (hardback). 
HEINER BIELEFELDT, Director of the German Institute for Human Rights, 
Berlin 
Patrick Frierson's book fits into a series of recent Kant publications de-
voted to challenging the stereotype that Kantian philosophy is a purely 
abstract enterprise, largely disconnected from human experience. The 
most famous formulation of that stereotype, which itself was already 
brought up by some of Kant's contemporaries, is Hegel's allegation that 
the Kantian moral law remains "something empty which can never be-
come reality." However, like Onora O'Neill, Allan Wood, Paul Guyer, and 
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Robert Louden (to name only a few) Frierson demonstrates that Kant's 
moral philosophy does in fact connect with the real world. In order to 
account for that connection, anthropology plays a crucial role. For Kant, 
anthropology represents empirical knowledge about human beings in 
the broadest sense, encompassing a range of different disciplines, such as 
physiology, psychology, education, history, and even facets of what later 
will be called sociology. Thus, taking anthropology into account can make 
a big difference for a more comprehensive understanding of Kant's moral 
philosophy. It adds dimensions, often neglected in traditional Kant lit-
erature, such as emotions, feelings, education, character building, or the 
rules of politeness. 
Whereas there seems to be a general agreement among Kant scholars 
that anthropological knowledge, as Kant himself has pointed out, can 
have a bearing at least on the application of the categorical imperative, 
Frierson goes an important step further. Rather than merely facilitating 
a more appropriate use of an already existing moral will, he claims that 
anthropology is significant for understanding and promoting the very 
development of the moral will. Empirical factors, he contends, can have 
an influence on the cultivation and stabilization of the moral will. They 
can provide assistance for defending the moral will against temptations 
to transgress the moral law. Besides supporting the cultivation of one's 
own will, they can also serve as devices for the moral education of oth-
ers. Hence Frierson concludes that empirical anthropology, rather than 
belonging merely to the margins of applied ethics, affects the very center 
of Kant's moral philosophy. 
At the same time, Frierson is anxious to keep the systematic insights 
of Kant's practical philosophy uncompromised. He criticizes some Kant 
scholars for having sacrificed the specific features of Kantianism in order 
to make Kant's philosophy more persuasive to common sense. What is 
distinctive in Kant's moral philosophy, according to Frierson, is his con-
ception of freedom as something beyond theoretical deduction as well as empiri-
cal fixation. As Kant argues, freedom reveals itself via the awareness of the 
moral law, an awareness which due to its peculiar obtrusiveness can be 
compared to a fact. However, it is a /lon-empirical fact which Kant calls the 
"fact of reason" that "forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori 
proposition." In order to underline the trans-empirical dimension of the 
awareness of the moral law, Kant repeatedly speaks of the "inscrutability" 
of freedom. Unlike those Kant scholars who more or less replace the phi-
losophy of transcendental freedom with an empirical ethics that certainly 
cannot do justice to Kant's philosophical aspirations, Frierson sticks to the 
insight into the inscrutability of freedom as one of Kant's most important 
contributions to an understanding of morality: "What makes Kant both 
distinctive and attractive remains his emphasis on freedom from empiri-
cal influence in determining the content of the moral law and acting on the 
basis of it" (163). 
Now, the question naturally arises how to reconcile these seemingly 
opposing claims: the significance of empirical anthropology for a com-
prehensive account of Kant's moral philosophy on the one hand, and the 
Kantian emphasis on the trans-empirical "inscrutability" of freedom on 
the other. This exactly is the question Frierson wants to tackle-no doubt 
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an ambitious project because, as he maintains, "no one has yet offered a 
sufficient integration of Kant's moral anthropology with his conception of 
freedom" (8). 
In the first part of his book Frierson gives a detailed analysis of the 
problem. By insisting on (1) the non-empirical status of freedom, (2) the 
truly empirical character of anthropological knowledge, and (3) the sub-
stantial importance of anthropology for a full understanding of Kant's 
moral philosophy, Frierson bars all easy ways out of the dilemma. In the 
second part of the book he finally claims to come up with a solution. 
A concept that frequently occurs in part II of Frierson's book is the no-
tion of hope. This and similar terms are of strategic significance, because 
they allow for bridging the gap between trans-empirical freedom and 
empirical anthropology without simply merging these two dimensions of 
analysis. Although the moral will is not, strictly speaking, dependent on 
any hope, since it has its own motivating force (i.e., respect for the moral 
law), the factual development of a moral character would be a purely he-
roic endeavor likely to fail, unless human beings could find some reason-
able encouragement in the empirical appearances of their behavior that 
indicate that they are actually on the right track. It is in this sense that 
hope or encouragement is pragmatically needed both in one's moral self-
education as well as in the moral education of others. Such a pragmatic 
need for hope even extends into a religious dimension without which the 
human propensity to "radical evil" would likely lead to despair and thus 
the collapse of any attempts to moral self-cultivation. The tension between 
the unconditioned claims of morality on the one hand, and the experience 
of human frailty and even wickedness, on the other, may lead human be-
ings to invest hope in divine grace as a complement to their never-ending 
moral endeavors. 
However, hope differs from knowledge. It is highly important to keep 
that difference in mind. Were human beings able to acquire definitive 
knowledge about their own moral progress, they would likely end up in 
complacency, i.e. an attitude that corrupts the earnestness of the moral 
will altogether. The ultimate non-knowledge in questions of moral per-
formance therefore deserves to be appreciated as something positive. 
Likewise, moral encouragement in education differs from all forms of 
empirical manipulation that might accomplish certain behavior but will 
eventually fail to bring about a genuinely moral will. Again, the lack of 
direct pedagogical knowledge and influence on the development of a 
pupil's moral will is something positive. Generally speaking, the integra-
tion of empirical anthropology into moral philosophy has to be a criti-
cal integration of such a kind that the insight into the final inscrutability of 
freedom remains uncompromised. This, however, is to say that the precise 
way in which empirical forces can exercise some influence on the moral 
will ultimately goes beyond empirical investigation. Or, to put it a bit pro-
vocatively, what Kant writes about divine grace is symptomatic also of the 
more "mundane" aids to the moral will, namely, that their actual function-
ing remains philosophically unfathomable. 
In fact, the "solution" that Frierson offers in part II of his book does 
not really" solve" the problem of how exactly empirical anthropology can 
make a difference for the development of the moral will while at the same 
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time leaving the autonomy of the will intact. Instead, part II of the book in 
a way operates as a continuation of part I by giving a detailed and careful 
description of the problem-together with an intention to bar easy solu-
tions. Thus, Frierson goes on arguing against the possible misunderstand-
ing (at times to be found in the Kant literature) that an empirical assistance 
to the development and stabilization of the moral will, although certainly 
"needed" in a general way, could be taken as a strictly "necessary" pre-
condition for the very possibility of a good will: "The need for empirical 
aids to combat radical evil does not mark an exception to Kant's principle 
of 'ought implies can'" (135). 
Does Frierson succeed with his project to integrate Kant's anthropol-
ogy into his moral philosophy? The answer is yes and no. At the conclu-
sion of the book Frierson claims to have shown that "Kant can reconcile 
his strong conception of freedom with a robust moral anthropology" (p. 
166). Such reconciliation, however, is not tantamount to a full integration. 
As Frierson himself repeatedly emphasizes, empirical anthropology and 
the concept of freedom cannot be reduced to one another, and the way in 
which they relate to each other finally remains opaque. This is not a bad 
result since it enhances the awareness of the limits of any empirical in-
quiry, an insight which, as Frierson persuasively argues, remains relevant 
as "a Kantian legacy for today" (165). 
Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy, by Heiner Bielefeldt. 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 202. $60.00 (cloth). 
PATRICK R. FRIERSON, Whitman College 
Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy is a sweeping book, 
covering a wide variety of important topics in Kant's practical philosophy, 
ranging from Kant's categorical imperative to his accounts of history and 
religion. The book has eight chapters. In the first, Bielefeldt introduces the 
overall purpose of the book in two ways. First, he explains that "the gen-
eral purpose of this book is to show that Kant's practical philosophy can 
help us to develop an appropriate language of liberal ethics in the broad-
est sense" (3). Second, the book's "purpose ... is to reconstruct the role 
that symbolic representation plays in the entire architecture of Kant's prac-
tical philosophy" (10). Although Bielefeldt has some provocative hints in 
his introduction and conclusion regarding the first point, the second is 
really the focus of the book. With the exception of occasional references to 
the political dangers of dogmatic or overly skeptical approaches to ethics 
(e.g., "bigotry" on p. 32 or "ideological witch hunts" on p. 103), liberalism 
does not appear in the core of the book. And Bielefeldt makes no system-
atic effort to show how the specific way in which Kant uses symbolic rep-
resentation is well suited to liberal ethics.! Still, this frame sets a context 
of political and ethical relevance for what might otherwise be a book of 
interest primarily for Kant's scholars. 
The second task, of reconstructing the role of symbolic representa-
tion in the whole of Kant's philosophy, provides Bielefeldt with a rubric 
